Why Iran Isn't Backing Down on Lebanon
With the White House hosting rare talks between the military chiefs of Israel and Lebanon, the battle taking place on the sidelines of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is moving front and center.
U.S. ally Israel is pushing for the disarmament of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, a key member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance coalition that intervened in the immediate wake of the October 2023 attack by the Palestinian Hamas group-triggering the regional conflict that has engulfed the Middle East. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has emphasized the battle with Hezbollah was not over, regardless of progress in U.S.-Iran negotiations.
Iran, which has thus far withstood the war launched against it by the U.S. and Israel three months ago despite the killing of its leader and other key figures, is demanding that a cessation of hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, be included in any lasting peace agreement.
This puts President Donald Trumpin a tough position. Netanyahu has vowed lasting results in Lebanon, while few expect the Islamic Republic to give up on its condition of protecting one of its closest allies, even if it means enduring further economic pain, or renewed military action.
For Tehran, it’s no choice at all.
“Iran does not see itself facing a choice between ‘an economic deal’ and ‘supporting Hezbollah,'” Iranian international affairs analyst Hassan Beheshtipour told Newsweek. “From Tehran’s perspective, a ceasefire in Lebanon is a fundamental condition for any agreement with the United States.”
“This is not merely due to ideological support for Hezbollah; rather, it reflects Iran’s understanding of its own national security,” Beheshtipour said. “In Iran’s view, threats in West Asia are interconnected, and the continuation of war in Lebanon directly affects Iran’s strategic stability.”
Iran’s Own NATO
Hezbollah is a founding member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, a bloc forged with support of the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) amid the turmoil of the 1980s. As post-revolutionary Iran contended with an invasion from neighboring Iraq, the newly established Islamic Republic quickly began to assemble a network of non-state allies to boost asymmetrical deterrence in the face of a lack of international support.
Iran was directly involved in the organization of Hezbollah among Shiite Muslim fighters battling an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. The strategy was replicated in Iraq among militias confronting both U.S. troops and Sunni Muslim militant forces in the wake of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, and once again in Yemen following the uprising of the rebel Ansar Allah, or Houthi movement, in the early 2010s.
Hezbollah’s significance to Iran also derives from the leading role it played in supporting shoring up the Axis of Resistance, directly training and aiding allied movements across the Middle East. Before his death at the hands of an Israeli airstrike in September 2024, Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah emerged as a symbol of shared resistance among these groups, rivaling even that of Iran’s own supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed in the opening phase of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.
The Iran-led coalition-including groups as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan-proved crucial in the fight against the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) and, for a time, in aiding the only other state member of the Axis of Resistance, Syria under President Bashar al-Assad. Assad’s downfall after 13 years of civil war came only as the coalition was mired in its most decisive confrontation to date with Israel following the eruption of the war in Gaza.
The constellation of unconventional allies has drawn deep criticism not only from the U.S. and Israel, who view much of its members as terrorist organizations, but also influential Arab states along the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. But Tehran’s actions indicate it continues to see the benefits of upholding the Axis of Resistance outweighing the economic and political consequences.
“If we hypothetically assume that such a condition were set aside, Iran would inevitably calculate whether tolerating a limited conflict in Lebanon-with the aim of preserving a minimum level of deterrence against Israel-still falls within its national interest, even if it results in delaying economic benefits,” Beheshtipour said. “In other words, from Tehran’s perspective, supporting strategic partners in the resistance front is not a ‘cost’ but an integral part of the national security equation.”
Meir Javedanfar, lecturer specializing on Iran at Reichman University, likened Iran’s calculus to that of the U.S.’ own forward defense posture via the NATO alliance.
“Iran views its Axis of Resistance allies as something akin to its own NATO, akin to its own defense, a network that would defend Iranian interests and aspirations in this region,” Meir Javedanfar, lecturer specializing on Iran at Reichman University, told Newsweek.
“And the fact that the Iranians are insisting that ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is included in a deal between Iran and the United States, and is willing to sacrifice a potential deal with the United States under crushing U.S. blockade of Iranian economy shows how important it is for Iran to protect Israel and how far it is willing to go,” Javedanfar said.
Three Iranian Advantages
Another complicating factor for the White House is the ability to which Iran continues to exert leverage in talks after three months of conflict.
Javedanfar cited three elements that have served to bolster Tehran’s advantage as the contest with Washington moves from the battlefield to the negotiating table.
The first, he pointed out, is the fact that, despite Iran holding presidential elections on a four-year, two-term basis much like the U.S., the Islamic Republic’s system is heavily weighted by the influence of the ruling clerical echelon, with the supreme leader at its head. Khamenei’s son and successor, Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei, is inoculated from the same kind of domestic political pressure facing Trump, and where his absence has raised questions, the powerful IRGC has stepped in.
That pressure is also enhanced by Iran’s second and perhaps most potent tool, its successful capacity to effectively blockade the Strait of Hormuz, an action that has sent global energy markets into disarray. Analysts believe the effects of this disruption are likely to have long-term, potentially permanent ramifications on international oil and gas trade, with consumers likely to foot a higher bill for the foreseeable future.
The strategy is complimented by another unprecedented Iranian action, the direct targeting of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states hosting U.S. military bases, and, in the case of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, direct ties to Israel. Plummeting petroleum production and the shattering of these nations’ images of stability have prompted heightened pressure toward Trump to de-escalate and strike a deal.
Iran’s Strait of Hormuz leverage proved a “huge boost of morale” for the government, while pressure on the GCC states has been “pushed effectively until today,” Javedanfar said.
Still, he argued that Iran’s rigid system constituted “the most important factor” as Khamenei’s “breathing room for maneuver regarding playing hardball with the United States is far bigger than President Trump, who is an elected leader and he has to stand for midterms, and, falling stock prices, the rising energy costs, too, affect his position.”
Meanwhile, Netanyahu also faces some disadvantages. The Israeli premier, though still dominant in domestic polls, has promised a lasting win against Hezbollah, yet his influence vis-à-vis Trump may be waning as Middle East turmoil drags on.
Trump portrayed himself firmly in the driver’s seat when remarking last week that Netanyahu will “do whatever I want him to do” in relation to the conflict.
“President Trump is telling the truth when he says he can tell Prime Minister Netanyahu what to do, because Prime Minister Netanyahu used much of his leverage during the Gaza war by taking decisions that were not only becoming contradictory to Israeli interests while prolonging the Gaza war, but also contrary to U.S. interests,” Javedanfar said. “
“There came a point, people like Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff became very concerned with Netanyahu’s behavior, especially after it attacked Qatar,” he added. “So, the view in Washington was that, ‘Okay, we now have to take control of the situation, we can’t let Netanyahu continue with this.'”
Risk of Derailment
Iran and Israel’s opposing aims in Lebanon also run the risk of upending talks altogether. While openly calling for an agreement, Trump has also signaled thinning patience with the protracted peace process.
Barbara Leaf, who served as assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs under former President Joe Biden, saw an Iranian strategy rooted in an attempt to exploit possible divisions between Trump and Netanyahu for its own gain.
“Tehran's quest for inclusion of Lebanon in a peace agreement is motivated by the desire to get the U.S. to tie Netanyahu's hands and compel IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon,” Leaf told Newsweek. “Iran would insist on terms that Israel would reject-full withdrawal of IDF from Lebanon, full cessation of attacks-and Trump is likely to brush that kind of secondary negotiation aside in the interest of getting a deal done for re-opening the Strait of Hormuz.”
She also questioned whether Hezbollah may ultimately accept a deal through which Iran would “restrain” its ally, which does not appear on the verge of defeat. While suffering growing casualties among its ranks, the group has increasingly inflicted casualties against Israeli forces through a new shift toward first-person view drone tactics and it continues to strike northern Israel.
Past truces in Gaza, Lebanon and even the U.S.-Iran ceasefire announced by Trump on April 8 have also demonstrated the tendency for actors to continue military actions that test the limits of such arrangements.
“The ‘ceasefire’ picture is a confused one, even under the current, temporary circumstances,” Leaf said. “In neither case–U.S.-Iran-Israel or Israel-Hezbollah–have the combatants ceased very regular attacks on each other.”
She suspected that, as in previous instances, Trump would grant “Netanyahu the carve-out of ‘self-defense’ when it comes to Israel acting in Lebanon” as part of any new deal with Iran, “allowing the IDF to do the work to weaken Hezbollah that the Trump administration is frustrated the Lebanese Armed Forces have not done.”
Calls for the Lebanese military to play a more assertive role in disarming Hezbollah are undermined by fears of ensuing instability, potentially across sectarian lines that spark painful memories of the nation’s brutal 1975-1990 civil war. Normalization with Israel also remains deeply unpopular, even if the Israel-Lebanon military meeting indicated a degree of progress in cooperation, a still-influential Hezbollah continues to have a say.
If a new ceasefire effort–now being termed a memorandum of understanding–were to bring a more sustainable end to the fighting, Iran would need to exert the necessary pressure to rein in its own ally, argued Mick Mulroy, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East under the first Trump administration.
“Iran of course wants to see the end of the war in Lebanon as part of an agreement to end the war between itself and the U.S.,” Mulroy told Newsweek. “That should come with Iran ensuring that Hezbollah no longer attack Israel. They have to be part of the equation to make this happen. If not, it won’t happen and shouldn’t be included.”
“Iran is the biggest destabilizing force in the Middle East,” Mulroy said. “They have to change that for there to be real long-lasting peace.”
At the same time, he described the timing of Netanyahu’s intensified intervention just as talks between Washington and Tehran appeared to be gaining ground as “problematic” and potentially designed to sabotage the negotiations themselves.
“Hezbollah did not sign on to the ceasefire agreement and every country does have a right to defend themselves,” Mulroy said, “but to launch a major operation going beyond even their self-declared yellow line indicates and effort to disrupt the potential signing of an MOU between the U.S. and Iran.”
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This story was originally published May 30, 2026 at 4:00 AM.